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Abstract 
The article proposes a Gender Politics of Aging approach to the study of aging 
societies. The approach recognizes the feminisation of old age, ageism’s roots in 
sexist discourse, and the need to recognise the role of politics in driving demographic 
debates. Drawing together arguments from feminist gerontology and political 
demography, the article argues that the intersection of politics and gender must be 
considered if appropriate responses to an older, feminised demography are to be 
produced. I conclude that the work of aging feminists provides a rich vein of research 
and praxis from which gender politics of aging approach can draw.  
KEYWORDS: Aging feminists, ageism, feminism, political demography. 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I set out the case for theorising and researching demographic aging with 
a feminist lens. Using recent work by Dahlerup (2016), I propose a Gender Politics of 
Aging Approach which acknowledges the feminisation of old age, and ageism’s roots 
in sexist discourse. The approach also recognises that mainstream research on aging 
is gender-blind. The article outlines a challenge for feminists to augment the status 
and significance of feminist inquiry, which leads the field in terms of critical and 
emancipatory approaches to understanding population aging (see Cruikshank, 2003; 
1 
 
Calasanti, Slevin and King, 2008; Calasanti, 2016; Harper, 2016; Woodward, 2003). 
A self-consciously politicised approach to researching old age is necessary if we are 
to produce a set of institutions and policy responses which confront the reality of 
increasing gender inequality and feminisation of old age (Weitz and Estes, 2001; 
Woodward, 2003: 56). The paper concludes that the work of aging feminists provides 
a rich vein of research and praxis on which a gender politics of aging approach can 
draw.  
The Status of Gender and Women in Mainstream Research on Aging 
Research on aging (gerontology) has made significant progress in recent decades, 
particularly in quantifying how age-related diseases affect life expectancy (Börsch-
Supan, 2013). Demographers have made numerous projections of the pace of aging 
in different regions of the world, which have been endorsed by major international 
organisations and supranational institutions (United Nations, 2015; European 
Commission, 2014).  However, in the clamber to understand the implications of 
population aging, researchers have neglected a number of key areas, not least the 
role of politics in shaping demographic outcomes, and vice versa (Teitelbaum, 2015: 
S87). The result is a large literature on how people age, but little insight into the role 
of political and policy decisions in producing population change. One major hurdle has 
been the increasing gap between what scientists have established without doubt, 
versus the persistence of myths and stereotypes of old age amongst electorates 
(Börsch-Supan, 2013).  
Demographer, Tietelbaum (2015) argues that analysis of the political implications and 
drivers of demographic change has fallen between two disciplinary stools. Political 
science has viewed demographic change as too indirect in terms of its impact on 
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elections, while demographers ‘seemed sceptical that actions by states could have 
much impact upon demographic trends’ (Teitelbaum, 2015: S88). As a result, there 
has been little or no serious academic work on what he calls ‘political demography,’ 
the increasingly significant field of study at the intersection of political science and 
demography. This field has fallen into the hands of ‘pundits’ and ‘political advisers’ 
who make outrageous claims of ‘demographic doom’ (Teitelbaum, 2015). We also see 
public attention focused on overly generalised assumptions such as the ‘rise of the 
grey vote’ which fuel an increasingly hostile attitude towards birth cohorts born 
between 1945 and 1964, often referred to as the baby boomers, in mainstream policy 
and public debate (Walker, 2012; Macnicol, 2015).  
An important finding from research of demographers like Teitelbaum (2015) and 
Coleman (2015) is that ‘demography is not destiny.’ Major drivers of demographic 
change such as migration, fertility and mortality are all affected by political decisions. 
While gerontologists have conducted important studies on older migrants (Warnes, 
2013), few have investigated the role of migration in driving demographic change 
(Harper, 2016; Rees, Wohland and Norman, 2013). Concurrently, evidence 
forthcoming from longitudinal datasets suggests that demographic aging is more open 
to influence from politics, economics or other shocks than is presented in public 
debate. Recently demographers like Harper (2016) have begun to present evidence 
in a way which acknowledges that gender relations can and do shape demographic 
trends. Harper’s work is valuable because it recognises the centrality of women’s 
fertility choices (where they exist) and female education rates in bringing down total 
fertility rates which in turn is a major driver of population ageing. However, her work is 
neither explicitly feminist, nor political as she stops short of claiming that population 
aging is a political issue with important gender implications.  
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Developing on a parallel trajectory are feminist perspectives on aging. This article 
seeks to connect political demography with feminist gerontology by arguing that 
population aging is shaped by women’s choices and oppression. Moreover, many of 
so called ‘challenges’ of population ageing are rooted in ageist societal norms, which 
can be resisted by feminist concepts and approaches. In this, I take up the baton from 
Ray (2004: 119) that feminist gerontology should, in theory, practice and policies: 
‘push feminist movement forward in the world and to change the negative images of 
aging, particularly for women.’   
Central to the idea that demographic ageing is an increasingly burdensome policy 
challenge is the concept of the ‘dependency ratio’ – and the belief that the number of 
workers to ‘dependents’ is decreasing. It has been felt that below replacement fertility 
rates left many countries in the Global North with an effective deficit in terms of 
productive labour (Spijker and Macinnes, 2013). This implies that rising female labour 
force participation rates, also affect the dependency ratio: ‘…later entry to 
employment, and earlier exit from it, has been more than offset by the large rise in 
employment among mothers, so that the proportion of the entire population who are 
at work is similar now (48%) to what it was 60 years ago (46%)’ (Spijker and MacInnes, 
2013: 2). Women’s status and longevity is also central to the scientific imperative to 
challenge/cure ageing, typified by active ageing and other productive, managed 
approaches to ageing popularised over the past three decades (Bulow and Soderqvist, 
2014; Calasanti, 2016).  
Sexism and the senescence paradigm: a potent mix in supporting ageism 
In his seminal cultural history of old age The Journey of Life, Cole (1993) identifies 
how and when old age stopped being accepted as a natural part of life, and began to 
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be viewed as a set of health conditions that could be managed. This philosophical and 
political shift of ageing and older people into the territory of ‘scientific management’ 
was not surprising given the growth in scientific responses to understanding all 
aspects of life in the late 19th and throughout the 20th century. Developmental biologist, 
Gilbert (2000: 318) explains:  
‘In 1900, 50% of American women were dead by age 58. In 1980, 50% of American 
women were dead by age 81. Thus, the phenomena of senescence and the diseases 
of aging are much more common today than they were a century ago… until recently, 
relatively few people exhibited the more general human senescent phenotype: graying 
hair, sagging and wrinkling skin, joint stiffness, osteoporosis (loss of bone calcium), 
loss of muscle fibers (sic) and muscular strength, memory loss, eyesight deterioration, 
and the slowing of sexual responsiveness.’ 
The acceptance of senescence as an immutable aspect of the human life course from 
the beginning of the 20th century has dominated our understanding of life, death and 
any changes in between. There are two important things to note: 
1) Most gains in life expectancy have been made by women, whose life expectancy is 
some five years longer than men’s in Europe, (Eurostat, 2015).  
2) Many of the projections which governments have used to plan for their ageing 
populations have not been subject to analysis for gender.  
This gender blindness has led to problems; as longitudinal data emerge projections 
turn out to have been way off the mark. For instance, in 2016, results of longitudinal 
research from Cambridge University revealed that the prevalence rates of dementia in 
those aged 65 and over has not increased to the extent expected twenty years ago 
(Malkki, 2016). The Cambridge study reveals a gender gap in rates of dementia; men 
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are much less likely to develop the disease, particularly vascular dementia. The 
reduced rate of dementia (perhaps the most feared of all of the demographic time 
bomb prophecies) was credited with lifestyle changes of men. These lifestyle changes, 
primarily cessation of smoking, were part of a public health message which set out to 
reduce coronary heart disease. A side effect was that men were now also, more likely 
to avoid dementia. So, while government and policy-makers have been assuming that 
dementia will place major pressure on states to provide eldercare, this may not be the 
case. Moreover, such a gender gap raises questions about whether public health 
interventions should be targeted at men and women in different ways, or whether 
women accumulate disadvantage which leads to a greater likelihood of developing 
dementia at the end of life. So, it would seem that the outcome of fifteen years of 
careful, scientific research into human aging, is the conclusion that, like other socially 
constructed human experiences aging is shaped by societal norms (Morelock, Stokes 
and Moorman, 2017).  
The assumption of senescence also permeates policy planning for ageing populations. 
Many policy plans, including age-friendly and active ageing strategies, (see Hamblin, 
2013), begin with chronological age, and then socially construct a range of problems, 
opportunities and possible scenarios of dependency ratios and disability rates on that 
basis. When senescence is assumed and essentialist reasoning is applied at the 
individual level, it is harmful and discriminatory. When we assume that whole sections 
of the population are in decline but politically strategic, the result is ill designed policies 
and populist slanging matches which promote the idea of intergenerational conflict 
(Binstock, 2010). Moreover, when ageism and sexism intersect, the problem of 
population ageing quickly becomes the problem of old women, as applied to the whole 
continent of Europe by Pope Francis in 2015 (see Carney and Gray, 2015: 128).  Over 
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a decade since Woodward (2003) identified anger as the necessary ingredient for a 
social politics of aging, the sexism/ageism nexus has become more institutionalised, 
particularly since the impact of austerity in advanced democracies, which also happen 
to be frontrunners in terms of demographic aging. For the purposes of illustration, I will 
concentrate on the political participation of baby boomers, and, how this affects public 
perception of them as a group.    
Political Participation of Baby Boomers & how they are viewed as a group 
Baby boomers have a reputation for electoral activism, which is often misconstrued. 
For instance, Binstock (2010) has argued that the fact that over 65s receive medicare 
and social security, and are known to be electorally active, has contributed to a divisive 
politics of age-based special interests in the United States (Binstock, 2010; Moody, 
2016). In Europe we see the development of a similar politics of aging whereby the 
fact that boomers are more likely to vote than younger cohorts is seen as problematic. 
Conservative commentators have argued that the combination of accumulated 
property wealth and their electoral activism puts older people in a position to vote 
strategically in their own interests, depriving younger cohorts of resources (Willets, 
2010; Howker and Malik, 2010).   
Some of these views are political ramifications of institutionalised retirement; having a 
large number of people of similar age categorised as inactive has repercussions for 
the status of that group in society (Carney, 2010). These views are sometimes 
reinforced by a casual ageism, underpinned by the assumption of senescence. The 
next logical step is to assume that such a mass of, essentially unemployed people of 
similar age will result in bloc and strategic voting. These stereotypes can be observed 
in newspaper headlines such as ‘Europe’s worrying gerontocracy (Charlemagne, 2010 
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at http://www.economist.com/node/15867833). Again, scientific evidence contradicts 
this public view; political demographers argue that any expectation that predictions of 
a gerontocracy will result from demographic ageing are contrary to scientific evidence 
from Europe. Goerres (2008: 69) demonstrated that while European senior citizens do 
vote in higher numbers, they tend not to vote in their own interests, or cohesively as a 
bloc. Since then, Binstock (2011) did find some evidence of strategic voting by seniors 
in the US 2010 election, but we have yet to see such voting behaviour in a European 
context. However, for the reasons outlined by Teitelbaum (2015) earlier, the absence 
of data has led to ageist punditry, allowing for the social construction of boomers in 
negative terms (Carney, 2010). The recent ‘Brexit’ debates in the UK offer evidence 
of this negative social construction of the boomers as greedy and selfish.  
‘Brexit’ refers to the decision by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to leave the European Union following a referendum on June 23, 2016. In the 
divisive and populist public debate that followed the Brexit referendum (where 
majorities in England and Wales – but not Scotland or Northern Ireland – voted to 
leave the Social Union) ‘baby boomers’ were blamed for voting leave. A typical 
comment on twitter: ‘Old people drove this. The baby boomer, the most selfish 
generation of them all. Your death bed legacy is the end of the UK’ (Smitty 
@desmondfunk posted 11.02pm on 23 June, 2016). This comment was followed by 
many more, in a similar vein: ‘As they sit in their mortgage free houses with copper-
fastened pensions’ (Yvette Shapiro @yvetteshapiro posted 11.07pm on June 23, 
2016). The blaming of the ‘baby boomers’ for many of the problems of inequality and 
insecurity that have resulted from globalisation and the de-regulation of capital 
markets (Ragan 2010) is not new. When commenting on the response of the UK 
government to the global economic crisis, leading gerontologist, Alan Walker makes 
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the case that demographic ageing has been used politically, as a means to justify 
austerity, and to promote compliance amongst electorates affected by the global 
economic recession (Walker, 2012). Referring to the UK coalition government (2010-
2015), Walker offers numerous examples of how older people, and baby boomers in 
particular have become fair game in public debate in an age of austerity: ‘Under the 
headline ‘We simply cannot afford to pay for our old age’, The Telegraph of 15 March 
2012 referred to the ‘burgeoning costs of an ageing population’ as ‘a much bigger 
problem’ than the structural deficit’ (Walker, 2012: 813). Walker refers to this trend, 
led by the Conservative right, such as David Willits, author of The Pinch: how the baby 
boomers have stolen their children’s future and why they should give it back as ‘The 
New Ageism’ - where demographic ageing as an unsustainable burden becomes a 
self-evident truth.  
Where is gender in the debate on political participation of older people? 
While the fact that age identities are gendered is recognised and documented 
(Sawchuk, 2009: Brown and Rohlinger, 2016), gender has been ignored in the public 
and academic debates about the baby boomers capacity to claim electoral favours. 
Yet, the issue of age and political representation is linked to deeper and wider gender 
inequalities in political representation. While most MPs are over 50, the majority of 
older people, particularly the oldest old, are female (Eurostat, 2015). These women 
were never a political priority, from their education as little girls, through the free labour 
they provided as mothers, through the years they spent working for lesser pay and 
now as widowed old ladies who need care (Hooyman, 2002). Fiscal sustainability is 
never measured in terms of the free care provided by women. The opportunity cost of 
caring for children or relatives is not taken into account when assessing whether 
someone qualifies for a ‘contributory pension’. By the time women reach the stage 
9 
 
whereby they need eldercare, their accumulated disadvantage is seen as a problem 
of old age – it is rarely linked to the gendered institutions that have shaped their life 
trajectories (Rich, 1977). Feminists working in gerontology have argued, since the 
1970s, that gender and aging intersect in many ways (Arber and Ginn, 1991; Garner, 
1999; Ray, 1999). It is only now, that the numbers of older women has reached a 
critical mass, and that feminists have accumulated lived experience of aging, that we 
have enough situated knowledge of aging in patriarchal societies raises specific issues 
and controversies.   
Why we need aging feminists to counter the ageism/sexism nexus 
The most powerful work in feminist gerontology is offered by writers who express lived 
experience of ageism in feminist terms. Friedan’s (1993) Fountain of Age, Segal’s 
(2013) Out of Time, Greer’s (1992) The Change, and de Beauvoir’s (1971) Old Age 
are all examples of feminists, connecting their occupation of an aging body and the 
discrimination they experience as ‘invisible’ older women (King, 2013) to the 
intersection of ageism and sexism in basic societal norms and political institutions. 
Gullette (1999; 2008; 2013) has made a career of pugnacious and acute critique of 
the seven ages of womanhood, eventually recognising herself as ‘an age critic’ 
(Gullette, 2008). She has published a series of books with titles such as Safe at Last 
in the Middle Years (1988) Declining to Decline (1997) and, finally, Age Wise (2013) 
her most overtly political book. Her feminist approach sets the tone and content for 
Declining to Decline, as she clearly makes an important link between biology and 
social status, or the aging body and her declining status: ‘“Decline” was my new name 
for the enemy. If decline was a “disposition,” it depended on an ideology that sank 
nails deep into ordinary people. Fiercely supported by institutions and dollar signs, it 
affected unconscious habits, every sub-identity, ways of seeing bodies, explanations 
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of history. It distorted visual culture. If you fought it alone, that fight warped your 
eyesight and sapped your energy.’ (Gullette, 1997: 191). Here, Gullette is making a 
plea that her perceived decline is not a personal, but a political issue, an 
institutionalised form of bigotry that shapes how money is made (and lost), who is in 
power, (or not) and who is valued by culture (or not). She calls, albeit indirectly, for a 
gender politics of aging: ‘Like gender and racial studies, age studies have a mission, 
but despite AARP’s millions of members, gerontology’s dedicated field workers, we 
acutely lack an anti-decline movement’ (emphasis added) (Gullette, 2008: 195). Her 
conclusion is a rallying cry: ‘I’m not so much afraid of aging, but the new regimes of 
ageism ought to be terrifying us all’ (Gullette, 2008: 195).   
What I am suggesting here is a development on this critical feminist understanding of 
aging and ageism/sexism. I suggest that there is room to move the whole debate on 
population aging at the societal level, what is known as the political economy of aging 
(Estes, 1979; Walker, 1981) into the realm of gender politics. I suggest this for a 
number of reasons already outlined, not least that it is increasingly obvious that 
population aging prompts politically motivated responses by governments. Second, 
the pertinence of the toughest challenges of population aging (such as the rising 
demand for eldercare) are left as the responsibility of women (Hooyman, 2002). 
Finally, because recent work on feminist citizenship (Lombardo and Verloo, 2009) and 
the evolution of gender discourses suggest that rather than achieving the slow and 
steady progress in augmenting female representation and the influence of women in 
power, Dahlerup (2016: 5) tentatively identifies a process of stagnation or decline of 
women’s influence; ‘Defeminization?!’ This progress of gender equality in political 
institutions must be in some way influenced by how gender intersects with other 
inequalities. By taking the conscious step of invoking a gender politics of aging in the 
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way I propose here, this approach has the potential to move forward our understanding 
of intersectionality and feminist citizenship, as outlined by Lombardo and Verloo (2009: 
113):   
‘the question of intersectionality more generally steers the debate towards more 
complex ways of thinking and treating gender and other inequalities (Walby, 2007), by 
suggesting the need to overcome a simple bipolar logic of analysis… instead of 
focusing on the theoretical and actual social and political problem that the various 
inequalities of race, gender, class and so on intersect with each other (Crenshaw, 
1989).’ 
The work of Gullette (1997), Friedan (1993), Cruikshank (2003) and Woodward (2003) 
documents how sexism and ageism have affected their experience of work, family, 
political and cultural life in different ways throughout the life course. While sexism 
might be the ‘the more dominant benchmark’ early in life, this changes as one reaches 
menopause and beyond when age becomes the characteristic which is used to define 
group membership, capacity and worth. This temporality of experiencing intersecting 
forms of oppression has been documented by older feminists. Here, Margaret Simey 
(in Bytheway, 2005: 364) describes the impact of her 90th birthday on others’ attitudes 
towards her:  
‘The transformation was stunning. I was no longer one of them. I was an outsider. I 
seemed to be in a foreign country. I didn’t speak the language. I didn’t know the rules. 
I was no longer me, Margaret, very defiantly my own person. Now I was simply one of 
a mass of clones, a stereotype, a number, not an individual. I was old and that was all 
that needed to be said.’  
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Citing Haraway’s (1991) conception of ‘situated knowledge’ Woodward (2003) offers 
an insightful critique of the disempowering of old women through a potent mix of 
senescence paradigm of aging with sexism. She argues that by expecting old people’s 
behavior (particularly old women) to be wise and dignified we are repressing any 
potential of anger ‘that is needed to stimulate personal and social change’ (Woodward, 
2003: 56). She goes on to argue that ‘… angry women have long been labeled 
irrational or hysterical… anger in the old is outlawed… as “conventionally 
unacceptable” (Jagger, 1989 cited in Woodward, 2003: 64). This reasoning suggests 
that angry old women could play a vital role in shaping a more humane and culturally 
rich transition to an older demographic profile.  
How can a feminist framework be applied to aging? 
Applying a feminist framework to aging poses theoretical challenges as well as 
opportunities for praxis (Calasanti, Slevin and King, 2006). Dahlerup’s article on the 
gender equality as ‘closed case’ is also relevant because she discusses feminist 
concepts and how they are applied to her analysis of the development of a hegemonic 
discourse that ‘we-are-all-for-gender-equality’ in  Danish political culture (Dahlerup, 
2016). She also offers a concise and insightful definition of the concept of ‘Feminism’: 
‘The classic definition of Feminism as an ‘ism,’ covering all the different subtypes, is 
that Feminism is a belief system which rests on three components: 1. Opposition to 
sex hierarchy (patriarchy) as a system, which permeates the whole society. 2. The 
belief that women’s position is socially constructed rather than predestined by God or 
Nature. 3. An identification with ‘the group called women’ (Cott, 1987; Dahlerup, 
2013).’ 
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Dahlerup’s conceptualisation of Feminism is useful when investigating the potential of 
ageism and sexism operating in similar manners, and, as I have argued, of affecting 
the same people (i.e. women) at different points on their life course. First, the view 
proposed in this article – that aging at the population level is not necessarily a problem, 
but is conceived as a problem due to endemic sexism at the societal level (Carney 
and Gray, 2015) is supported by the notion of anti-ageism as a belief system, rather 
than an evidence based, neutral, policy intervention. For critical gerontologists (myself 
included) anti-ageism is more than a research question, it is a belief system akin to 
feminist politics. Critical gerontologists do not just ‘study older people,’ we seek to use 
emancipatory frameworks which challenge ageist ideology (Hooyman, 2002).  
The second element of Dahlerup’s (2016) definition applies; my contention is that the 
position of older people (particularly older women) is socially constructed, rather than 
predestined by senescence (Nature) or God. This is where the ‘situated knowledge’ 
(Lombardo and Verloo, 2009: 114) of older feminists such as Greer (1992) and Friedan 
(1993) is especially useful as a means to challenge senescence. On her third element 
- identification with ‘a group called women’ – the ageism/sexism analogy is less 
successful. While there have, rightfully, been deep debates about how the diversity of 
women is not represented by feminism (hooks, 1981), the diversity of the older 
population (across class, gender, ethnicity and the inequalities between the Global 
South and the Global North) has not been adequately dealt with in the gerontology 
literature (Sawchuk, 2009).  
The challenge cuts both ways – gerontology needs to consider politics of gender, but 
gender analysts also need to include older women as ‘old age, as a political location, 
has been ignored’ (Calasanti, Slevin and King, 2006: 14). For instance, research on 
the gender impact of the economic crisis (2008 onwards) refers to the need to make 
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a concerted effort to agitate to include women’s issues in order to avoid the rolling 
back of gains made during more prosperous and stable economic times (Murphy, 
2015; Cullen, 2014). This literature does not mention older women, or the intersection 
of age and gender, reflecting the ‘relative neglect of aging women in both gerontology 
and feminism’ (Hooyman, 2002: 4). Ignoring older women, particularly older feminists 
would be a mistake for any of us involved in either the anti-ageism, or feminist 
movements.  
One way to bridge this gap could be to engage with classic feminist writings but with 
a gerontological gaze. For instance, re-reading Rich’s (1977/1987) Of Woman Born: 
Motherhood as Experience and Institution but with a gerontological gaze reveals a 
number of interesting potential lines of enquiry. Rich’s description of her approach to 
theorising from experience as an ‘odd-fangled’ approach to writing – ‘personal 
testimony mingled with research, and theory which derived from both’ (Rich, 1987: 2) 
now typifies how use of the first person allowed women to take ownership of their lives 
and experiences. Feminist writing provided a platform on which women’s individual 
experiences could be politicised, validated and collectively challenged. A similar 
approach is being used by aging feminists to great effect. Friedan’s (1993) Fountain 
of Age led the way in articulating the seismic gap between the lived experience of old 
age, and the gerontologists’ macro-level analysis of the ‘demographic time-bomb.’ 
Since then, more and more voices have been added, in a similarly ‘odd-fangled’ 
approach (Rich, 1977), notably Cruikshank’s (2003) powerful exposition of lived 
experience in Learning to be Old.  
Second, Rich links lived experience with social institution to articulate her call to action 
(1977: 61-2). She discusses how once a woman becomes pregnant the weight of 
centuries of social conditioning, norms and expectations, societal pressures and 
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demands within personal relationships fall on her like a weight, making it very difficult 
for her to do or say anything other than what has been done before. If we conceive old 
age as a similarly socially constructed institution, it helps us to understand cultural 
norms which deny ageing; we are not willing to begin to bear that weight – the weight 
of centuries of senescence – where our status and value will be cumulatively devalued, 
year on year. So as old age approaches we experience a ‘misalignment between 
societal age norms and personal lived experience’ which requires us to either deny 
our chronological age, or put some distance between our ‘subjective and chronological 
age’ (Morelock et al 2017: 16).   
The experience of old age is not individual, it is to enter an institution with many of the 
hallmarks of Rich’s depiction of motherhood in a patriarchal society. In the case of old 
age, we are passively handing our ‘power to the world outside our bodies’ (Rich, 1977: 
61) because we cannot find a meaningful identity which is worth having within the 
strictures of the institution of old age as it currently stands. In denying our own ageing, 
we are denying that old age is a political status as well as a physiological transition. It 
is experienced differently by men and women, it is intricately related to the politics of 
reproduction, to our relation with the economic system and to the extent to which 
patriarchy dominates public and family life.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The rolling back or stagnation of female political representation and influence has a 
major implication for the study of older women, not least, it demonstrates that women 
now in their 60s and older, specifically the baby boomers may know more about 
producing the kind of social and political change we identify as a ‘feminist movement’ 
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than women who grow up with all of the benefits of gender equality legislation. 
Dahlerup (2016) refers to the need to recognise that gender equality is not a question 
of steady, forward thrust, or even slow and steady gains.  Feminist gerontologists 
argue that similar fluctuations are evidenced across the life course: ‘Divorce laws, age 
discrimination, limited research on their health concerns, and demeaned physical 
appearance individually and collectively challenge older women’s attempts to age with 
dignity’ (Hooyman, 2002: 7).  
While the evidence to support this viewpoint of the feminisation of old age, which is 
typical in feminist gerontology, it has yet to showcase the counter evidence of aging 
women writers and activists who find new reasons to organise collectively, write 
critically and challenge ageism and sexism in later life (Segal, 2014; Woodspring, 
2015). In terms of political institutions, we may also find, that what was done in the 
past, the low tech politics of grass roots activism, community building through women’s 
groups could offer a way forward for both gender and gerontology scholars. The 
capacity of some baby boomers to organise street protests and use old-fashioned 
grassroots community organisation to combat cutbacks in the austerity programmes 
in Europe lends credence to this view (Carney, 2010). Concepts such as ‘solidarity’ 
and ‘community’ which provided political slogans for 1960s counter culture now 
challenge the rhetoric of neo-liberalism (we see this in the rise in popular, youthful 
support for the old Left in the UK Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, for instance). 
This renaissance of radical old men (Corbyn) and radical old women (Greer and 
Friedan) should prompt us to question whether old age always implies conservative 
views.  
Gender, Generation and Political Attitudes 
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In fact, there is research evidence that old age is not always synonymous with 
conservative attitudes. Galligan and McKnight’s (2011) analysis of support for gender 
friendly policies over time found older people to be more supportive of women in 
political office, than younger generations. They report that the oldest cohort in their 
analysis of the 2002 and 2007 Irish National Election Study ‘the 60-75 cohort is 
significantly more supportive of the idea that more women will improve politics than 
any of the other generations’ (Galligan and McKnight, 2011: 597). They explain this 
finding in terms of the political socialisation of baby boomers as more engaged with a 
lively civil rights movement in Ireland North and South in the 1960s and 1970s. In 
particular, boomers had the opportunity to observe women’s rights activists and the 
consequent election of women to political office. Later generations were not part of 
this movement and so did not have the opportunity to witness the people power of the 
civil rights movement. In New Social Movement studies, baby boomers are recognised 
as important campaigners for social justice. In the 21st century the ‘Raging Grannies’ 
provide important impetus for social change (Sawchuk, 2009) and in the twentieth 
century, Kuhn’s establishment of the Gray Panthers occupied a similarly radical, left-
wing stance (Garner, 1999).  This links back to Woodward’s (2003) argument that we 
should take up Greer’s call to angry protest in The Whole Woman (1999). Recent 
tumultuous political events such as the election of Donald Trump as US President 
suggest that old men on the Right have used their anger to greater effect than old 
women on the Left. For these reasons, it is all the more important that younger feminist 
scholars and activists to amplify the voices of old women.  Otherwise, there is a risk 
that the divisive politics of the early 21st century provide fertile ground for a generation 
gap within Feminism. Such a gap has been cited as a problem between older and 
younger feminists. For example, King (2013) refers to the ‘invisible older woman’ within 
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the feminist movement. In public debate, younger women describe feminists as ‘older 
women talking about the 70s’ (Hanson, 2013). Left wing media are beginning to argue 
that some of the tried and tested methods of communal living, ‘anti-hierarchal and 
collective working’ could be of use to millennials in taking on corporations and massive 
income inequality (Bindel, 2015). It has even been suggested that older women could 
spend their retirement passing on their politics of resistance to younger women. The 
potential for inter-generational solidarity across the feminist movement could allow 
younger women to learn important elements of feminist praxis such as communal 
living, the value or grassroots protest, and the importance of exercising suffrage in 
democratic systems.  This final point, that the young do not vote, and the old do, is 
perhaps the most urgent. A gender politics of aging underpinned by inter-generational 
solidarity between feminists could aim to increase political participation amongst the 
young, rather than simply blaming the old for being too politically active (Binstock, 
2010).   
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that demographic aging is neither inevitable nor natural, but it 
is deeply gendered. Populations ageing is the result of a complex reaction to historical 
change, political decision-making, technological and economic developments. How 
societies deal with demographic aging is inherently political. The challenge for the 21st 
century is to establish a new set of structures which can cater for current and future 
demographic change: ‘It is politics that will determine whether the structures of public 
pension and education systems can adjust to changing proportions of the population 
in youngest and oldest ‘dependent’ age groups’ (Teitelbaum, 2015: S90). It is 
increasingly apparent that populations, like Western Europe and the US, which have 
the highest proportion of people aged over 80 are becoming feminised. For this 
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reason, there needs to be more gender-sensitive analysis of the impact of population 
aging on women (Serrao, 2015). This work needs to be overtly feminist in order to be 
progressive. As Garner (1999; 12) has argued, we must all remember that we will be 
old one day.  As such, a gender politics of aging (not just a politics of aging) 
perspective is necessary to understand the deeply gendered implications of 
demographic change for society and policy.  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This article was completed with support from the ARK Ageing programme at QUB. 
Thanks are due to Yvonne Galligan, Dagmar Schiek and participants at the 
International Political Science Association Annual Conference in Poznan, Poland, 
July 2016. I am grateful to comments from an anonymous reviewer whose 
suggestions improved the paper.  
REFERENCES 
Arber, S. and Ginn, J. (1991) Gender and Later Life: A sociological analysis of 
resources and constraints. London: SAGE.  
Arber, S. and Timonen, V. (2012). Contemporary Grandparenting: Changing family 
relationships in global contexts. Bristol: Policy Press.  
Beck, U. (1992) The Risk Society: Towards a new modernity. London: SAGE.  
Bettio, Francesca, and Alina Verashchagina. (2012). Long-Term Care for the Elderly: 
Provisions and Providers in 33 Social Countries. Luxembourg: Publication office of the 
Social Union. 
20 
 
Bettio, F., A. Simonazzi, and Villa, P. (2006). “Change in Care Regimes and Female 
Migration: The ‘care Drain’in the Mediterranean.” Journal of Social Social Policy 16(3): 
271. 
Bindel, C. (2015) ‘Why the left should revisit the good old days of the feminist 
collective’ The Guardian, July 2015. 
Binstock, R.H. (2010) ‘From compassionate ageism to intergenerational conflict?’ The 
Gerontologist, vol 50, no 5, p 574–585. 
Binstock, R. H. (2011) ‘ 
Blinder, S. (March, 2016) ‘Briefing: Non-Social migration to the UK, family and 
dependents’ Compass, University of Oxford Migration Observatory.  
Börsch-Supan, A. (2013) ‘Myths, scientific evidence and economic policy in an aging 
world’ The Journal of the Economics of Aging, 1-2 (2013): 3-15.  
Boult, M. (June 24, 2016) ‘Millenials Fury Over Baby Boomers Vote for Brexit’ prevail 
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/millenials-fury-over-baby-boomers-
vote-for-brexit/) 
Brown, R. and Rohlinger, D. (2016) The effect of political generation on identity and 
social change: Age cohort consequences, Journal of Women & Aging, 28:2, 96-111, 
DOI: 10.1080/08952841.2014.950138  
Bülow, M. and Söderqvist, T. (2014) ‘Successful Aging: A historical overview and 
critical analysis of a successful concept’ Journal of Aging Studies: 31(2014): 139-149. 
Bytheway, B. (2005), Ageism and Age Categorization. Journal of Social Issues, 
61: 361–374. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2005.00410.x. 
21 
 
Calasanti, T. (2007) ‘Bodacious Berry, Potency Wood and the Aging Monster: Gender 
and Age Relations in Anti-Aging Ads’ Social Forces. 86: 1; 335-355. 
Calasanti, T. (2010) “Gender and Applied Research on Aging.” The 
Gerontologist, (50th anniversary issue) 50(6): 1-15. doi: 10.1093/geront/gnq085 
Calasanti, T. (2016) ‘Combating Ageism: How successful is successful aging?’ The 
Gerontologist. 56(6): 1093-1101.  
Calasanti, T. (2006) ‘Ageism and Feminism: From ‘et cetera’ to center’ NWSA Journal. 
18(1): 13-30.  
Charlemagne (2010) ‘Europe’s worrying gerontocracy: what happens when older 
voters dominate European elections’ The Economist 
(http://www.economist.com/node/15867833 downloaded, November 1, 2016).  
Carney, G. (2010) Citizenship and structured dependency: the implications of policy 
design for senior political power’ Ageing & Society, 30 (2010): 229-251.  
Carney, G. and Gray, M. (2015) ‘Unmasking the elderly mystique: why it is time to 
make the personal political in aging research’ Journal of Aging Studies, 35 (2015): 
123-134.  
Coleman, P. (2015) ‘Population aging – the long view,’ Population Studies, 69: sup1, 
S87-S95.  
Cole, T. (1992) The Journey of Life: A Cultural History of Aging in America. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
22 
 
Cullen, P. (2014) ‘Feminist NGO’s and the Social Union: Contracting Opportunities 
and Strategic Response’ Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and 
Political Protest, DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2014.965674.   
Cruikshank, M. (2003) Learning to be Old: Gender, culture and aging. Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield.   
Dahlerup, D. (2016) Gender discourses in an imagined gender equal society- results 
from a survey of the members of the Danish parliament 2015 presented at the Social 
Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy, April, 2016. (cited with permission).  
De Beauvoir, S. (1972). Old Age. London: Penguin. 
Estes, C. 1979. The Aging Enterprise : A Critical Examination of Social Policies and 
Services for the 
Aged. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, California. 
Estes, C. 2001. Social Policy and Aging : A Critical Perspective. Sage, Thousand 
Oaks, 
California. 
Estes, C., Biggs, S. and Phillipson, C. (eds) 2003. Social Theory, Social Policy and 
Aging : 
A Critical Introduction. Open University Press, Maidenhead, UK. 
European Commission (2014) ‘Population Aging in Europe: facts, implications and 
policies’ Brussels: Social Commission at 
(http://www.net4society.eu/_media/Population_Aging_in_Europe.pdf). 
Eurostat, (2015) ‘Mortality and Life Expectancy Statistics’ 
at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Mortality_and_life_expectancy_statistics 
23 
 
Fealy, G., McNamara, M., Treacy, M. and Lyons, I. (2012) ‘Constructing aging and 
age identities: a case study of news article discourses’ Aging and Society, 32 (1): 85-
102.  
Friedan, B. (1993) The Fountain of Age. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.  
Freixas, A., Luque, B. and Reina, A. (2012) ‘Critical feminist gerontology: In the back 
room of research’ Journal of Women and Aging, 21:1, 44-58.  
Galligan, Y. and McKnight, K. (2011) ‘Attitudes towards women in politics: Gender, 
generation and party identification in Ireland’ Parliamentary Affairs, 64(4): 585-611.  
Garner, D. J. (1999) ‘Feminism and Feminist Gerontology’ Journal of Women and 
Aging, 11: 2-3, 3-12.  
Gilbert, F. (2000) ‘Aging: the biology of senescence’ in Developmental Biology. 6th 
edition. Sunderland: Sinaur Assocs.  
Goerres, A. (2008) The political participation of older people in Europe, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gullette, M. (2007) ‘What exactly has age got to do with it? My life in critical age 
studies’ Journal of Aging Studies, 22: 189-195.  
Gullette, M. (2013) Agewise: Fighting the New Ageism in America. Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press.  
Gullette, M. (2004) Aged by Culture. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Gullette, M. (1988) Safe at Last in the Middle Years. Berkley: University of California 
Press.  
24 
 
Gullette, M. (1997) Declining to Decline: Cultural Combat and the Politics of the 
Midlife. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia. 
 
Greer, G. (1992) The Change: Women, Aging and the Menopause. New York: Alfred 
Knopf.  
Hagestad, G. and Uhlenberg, P. (2005) ‘The Social Separation of Old and Young: A 
root of ageism’ Journal of Social Issues, 61(2): 343-360.  
Hamblin, K. (2013) Active Aging in the European Union: Policy convergence and 
divergence. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Hanson, A. (2013) ‘What’s wrong with older women talking about the 70s?’ The 
Guardian, 19 August 2013. 
Haraway, D. (1984) ‘Primatology is Politics by Other Means’ PSA: Proceedings of the 
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. (1984): 489-524. 
Harper, S. (2006) ‘Addressing the implications of global aging’ Journal of Population 
Research, 23 (2): 205-223.  
Harper, S. (2016) How population change will transform our world. Oxford: OUP. 
hooks, B. (1981) Ain’t I a woman? Black women and feminism Boston, MA: South End 
Press.  
Hooyman, N., Browne, C., Ray, R. and Richardson, V., (2002) ‘Feminist gerontology 
and the life course’ Gerontology and Geriatrics Education. 22: 4, 3-26, DOI: 
10.1300/J021v22n04 02  
Howker, E. and Malik, S. (2010) Jilted generation: How Britain has bankrupted its 
youth, London: Icon Books. 
25 
 
King, J. (2013) Discourses of Aging in Fiction and Feminism: The invisible woman. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Laws, G. (1995) ‘Understanding ageism: lessons from feminism and postmodernism’ 
The Gerontologist, 35, 1, 112-118.  
Lombardo, E. and Verloo, M. (2009) ‘Contentious citizenship: feminist debates and 
practices and Social challenges’ Feminist Review, 92, 108-128.  
MacDonald, P. (2008) ‘Very Low Fertility: Consequences, causes and policy 
approaches’ The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol.6, No.1.  
Macnicol, J. (2015) Neo-liberalising old age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Malkki, H. (2016) ‘Declining dementia incidence in the UK’ Nature Reviews Neurology, 
12, 314, doi:10.1038/nrneurol.2016.67.  
Merritt, G. (2015) ‘The Refugee Crisis: Europe needs more migrants, not fewer’ 
Europe’s World at http://europesworld.org/2015/10/26/the-refugee-crisis-europe-
needs-more-migrants-not-fewer/#.V3EFEPkrLrc 
Morelock, J., Stokes, J. and Moorman, S. (2017) ‘Rewriting ageing to overcome 
misaligned age and gender norms in later life’ Journal of Aging Studies. 40 (2017): 16-
22.  
Murphy, M. P. (2015) ‘Gendering the narrative of the Irish crisis’ Irish Political Studies, 
30:2, 220-237.  
Ray, R. (2004) ‘Towards the croning of feminist gerontology’ Journal of Aging 
Studies. 18 (2004): 109-121.  
26 
 
Ray, R. and Fine, M. (1999) ‘Researching to transgress: the need for critical feminism 
in gerontology’ Journal of Women and Aging, 11: 2-3 pp. 171-184.  
Rich, A. (1977/1987) Of Woman Born: Motherhood as experience and institution. 
NY: Bantam Books.  
Rees, P., Wohland and Norman (2013) ‘The demographic drivers of future ethnic 
group populations for UK local areas 2001–2051’ The Geographical Journal, Vol. 
179, No. 1, March 2013, pp. 44–60, doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4959.2012.00471.x 
Sawchuk, D. (2009) ‘The Raging Grannies: Defying Stereotypes and Embarrassing 
Aging through Activism’ Journal of Women and Aging, 21: 3, 171-185.  
Segal, L. (2013) Out of Time: The Pleasures and Perils of Aging. London: Verso.  
Serrao, S. (2015) ‘Population aging and its gender dimensions: the direct and indirect 
impacts on women (A synthesis of literature with evidence from the Asia-Pacific 
region) available at 
(https://hr.un.org/sites/hr.un.org/files/Population%20aging%20and%20its%20gender
%20dimensions_0.pdf). 
Ragan R (2010) Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World 
Economy.Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Spijker, and MacInnes, J. (2013) ‘Population aging – the time bomb that isn’t’ British 
Medical Journal, 347:f 6598 doi: 10.1136/bmj.f6598 (Published 12 November 2013). 
Sonntag, S. (1972, September 23) ‘The Double Standard of Aging’ Saturday Review 
of the Society, 29-32.  
Teitelbaum, M. (2015) ‘Political demography: Powerful trends under-attended by 
demographic science’ Population Studies, 69: sup1, S87-S95.  
27 
 
Timonen, V., Convery, J. and Cahill, S. 2006. “Care Revolutions in the Making? A 
Comparison of Cash-for-Care Programmes in Four Social Countries.” Aging and 
Society 26(03): 455–74. 
United Nations (2015) World Fertility Patterns at  
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/fertility/world-
fertility-patterns-2015.pdf 
Walker, A. (2012) ‘The New Ageism’ Political Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 4, October–
December 2012 DOI: 10.1111. 
Warnes, T. (2013) ‘Migration and Age’ In Dannefer, D. and Phillipson, C. (eds.) The 
SAGE Handbook of Social Gerontology, London: SAGE.  
Weiner, J. and Tilley, J. (2002) ‘Population aging in the United States of 
America: implications for public programmes’ International Journal of Epidemiology 
2002 (31):776–781. 
Weitz, T. and Estes, C. (2001) ‘Adding Aging and Gender to the Women’s Health 
Agenda’ Journal of Women and Aging, 13: 2, 3-20. 
Willets, D. (2010) The Pinch: How the baby-boomers took their children’s future and 
how they can give it back, London: Atlantic Books.  
Woodspring, N. (2015) Baby Boomers: Time and aging bodies. Bristol: Policy Press.  
Woodward, K. (2003) ‘Against wisdom: the social politics of anger and aging’ Journal 
of Aging Studies. 17: 55-67.  
World Health Organisation (2014) ‘World Health Statistics, 2014’ 
(at  http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/world-health-statistics-
2014/en/ 
 
28 
 
 29 
 
